Recently, Boneh, Dunworth, and Lipton described the p o t ential use of molecular computation in attacking the UnitedStatesData Encryption Standard DES. Here, we provide a d escription of such a n a t t ack u s i n g t h e sticker model of molecular computation. Our analysis suggests that such an attack might be mountedon a table-top machine, using approximately a gram of DNA and might succeed even in the presence of a large number of errors.
Introduction
With theirwork on DES, Boneh, Dunworth, and Lipton Bo2 providedthe rst example of a practical" problem which might be susceptible to m o lecular computation. DES is one of the most widely used cryptographic systems. It produces a 64-bit ciphertext from a 64-bit plaintext under the control of a 56-bit key. While it has been argued that special purpose electronic h ardware Wi or massively parallel supercomputers might b e used to break DES in a reasonable amount o f t ime, it appears that t oday's most powerful sequential machineswould be unable to accomplish the task. We continue the work of Boneh, et al: by considering the di culty of breaking DES on the recently proposedsticker model of molecular computation Ro . While our results are encouraging, it must be stressed that the feasibility of such an attack will ultimately be decidedin the laboratory.
In this paper we consider the so called plaintext-ciphertext attack. Here the cryptanalyst obtains a plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext and wishesto d etermine t h e k ey used to perform the encryption. The m o s t n aive approach t o t his problem is to try all 2 56 keys, encrypting t h e p laintext under each key until a key that produces the ciphertext is found. Remarkably, a signi cantly more e cient attack is not known and consequently this brute force approach will be the one considered here.
We begin by describing the algorithm to implement a plaintext-ciphertext attack for breaking DES at a logical level. This allows us to identify the fundamental operations we need to implement on a stickers machine, and servesas a roadmap for what follows.
The Molecular Algorithm
Start with approximately 2 56 identical ssDNA memory strands Ro each 11580 nucleotideslong. We think of each memory strand as containing 579 contiguous blocks referred to a s regions in Ro B 0 ; B 1 ; B 2 ; :::; B 578 each 20 nucleotideslong. As is appropriate in the sticker model there are 579 stickers S 0 ; S 1 ; :::; S 578 |one complementary to each block. We refer to memory strands with annealed stickers as memory complexes. Hence, we consider that each strand represents a 579-bit memory, and we sometimesuse B i to refer to t h e bit which B i represents. Block B 0 is never set and i s u s e d l a t er in the implementation of the algorithm Subsection 3.1. Blocks B 1 though B 56 of the m emory strands are used to s t ore a key, t h e n ext 64 blocks, B 57 ; :::; B 120 , will eventually encode the corresponding ciphertext, and the remainder of blocks are used for intermediate results d uring t h e computation. The stickers machine which processes the m emory strands to compute t h e ciphertexts d o e s so under the control of a microprocessor. Because the plaintext is the same in all cases, the m i croprocessor may store it; we do not need to represent t h e p laintext on the m emory strands. Now, give n a p laintext-ciphertext pair, the algorithm is performedin three steps:
1. Input step: Initialize the memory strands to form memory complexes representing all 2 56 keys. 2. Encryption step: On each m emory complex compute the ciphertext corresponding t o t h e encryption of the p laintext under that complex's key. 3. Output step: Select the m emory complex whose ciphertext matchesthe given ciphertext, and read the corresponding k ey.
The bulk of the work is performedduring the second step, where DES data encryption occurs, so we outline it below. Our interest is in demonstrating how DES can be implementedon a molecular computer, and for thesepurposestheexact details of DES are unnecessary. For details, see Na . We will instead focus on the e s s e n t ial operations required in DES, and h o w t h ese operations are combinedto e ect the full algorithm.
DES is a 16-round cipher. In each round a new 32 bit intermediate result is produced. These are designated R 1 ; : : : ; R 16 . We store R 15 and R 16 in locations B 57 through B 120 adjacent t o t h e k ey, while R 1 ; : : : ; R 14 are stored in locations B 121 through B 568 . Essentially, R 15 and R 16 , t aken together, form the desired ciphertext. We encode the ciphertext adjacent to the key for implementation reasons explained in Subsection 3.4. The left 32-bits and right 32-bits of the plaintext are referred to as R ,1 and R 0 , and are known to t h e controlling m i croprocessor.
Bits B 569 through B 578 are used as a workspace and are written and erased during t h e course of the computation. Hence, unlike t h e other bits which are used in a write once" fashion, these bits m ay be cleared; for implementation reasons, we always clear the entire workspace at once.
Essentially, R i is obtained from R i,1 and R i,2 by t h e f o llowing computation:
where denotes exclusive or x-or, K i denotes a round d ependent selection of 48 bits from the key, E denotes the expand function which takes the 32 bits of R i,1 and repeats or permutes them to yield 48 bits, and S denotes the S-function which takes a 48-bit input and maps it to a 32-bit output.
The function E, the function S and the selection K i are hard-coded, like the plaintext, into t h e microprocessor.
In fact, the S-function can be separated into eight independent 6-bit to 4-bit functions known as S-boxes. Hence, each R i may be computedin eight independent o perations each of which produces a 4 bit chunk of the result. A given chunk is a function of 16 input bits: 6 bits of R i,1 , 6 bits of K i and 4 bits o f R i , 2 . W e d escribe the computation of a chunk below:
1. 6 bits o f R i , 1 and 6 bits o f K i are x-ored to produce a 6-bit result which is then sto r e d i n t h e w orkspace locations B The positions on each m emory complex of the 16 input bits required to compute a given chunk depend only on the c h u nk number 1,. . . ,8 and t h e round number 1,. . . ,16, though the 0 1 value of those bits will vary from memory complex to memory complex. The controlling microprocessor knows which positions contain these bits t h ey are hard-codedand knows the x-or or S-box which it needs to a p p ly.
We see, then, that encrypting a p laintext with DES comesdown to a process of either 1 selecting 2 bits, producing t h eir x-or, and w r i t ing t h e result i n a n ew bit, or 2 selecting 6 bits, applying a n S-box, and writing t h e resulting 4 bits.
Implementation
We now turn to implementing the algorithm on a stickers machine. Such a machine, as described in Ro , may be thought of as a parallel robotic workstation". It consists of a rack of tubes data tubes, sticker tubes, and operator tubes, some robotics arms, pumps, heater coolers, connectors, etc: and a m i croprocessor that controls the robotics. Roweiset al: assume t h a t t h e components o f t h e robotics and a s e t of three data o r o perator tubes may be arranged to perform any of the following four operations: separate, combine, set and clear.
We assume that t h e robotics are capable of an extendedset of operations:
1. Parallel separate. The robotics can separate the DNA from each of 32 data tubes into two more data tubes by using 32 separation operator tubes at once. 2. Parallel combine. The robotics can combine the DNA from 64 di erent data t u bes into o n e d a t a t u be at once. We a s s u m e t h a t t h e blank operator tube used for a combine in Ro is really just a connector which is part of the robotics. 3. Parallel set. The robotics can, using one sticker tube with stickers S k , set the bit B k on the complexes in 64 di erent data t u bes at once. We assume t h e sticker operator tube used for set in Ro is just a lter that can be built i n t o t h e robotics.
4. Clear. The robotics can clear the w orkspace bits on all complexes in one data tube. We assume that the stickers on the workspace are removed simultaneously. Hence the w orkspace blocks may be implemented using so called weak regions Ro . Again, we a s s u m e t h e sticker operator tube used for clear in Ro is just a l t er that can be built i n t o t h e robotics.
Hence, we perform the abovefour operations using just data tubes that may hold DNA memory complexes, sticker tubes that are for the purpose of the computation an inexhaustible source of a particular sticker S k , a n d separation operator tubes that h o ld probes for a particular block B k .
In the f o llowing s u bsections we d escribe, where applicable, the implementation of the molecular algorithm using these operations and, for the purposes of estimating the time and space required by a stickers machine we keep track of the following t hree resource quantities:
1. Total steps. We de ne the number of steps as the number of parallel separations, parallel combines, parallel sets or clears that any given complex experiences after it has been initialized. Hence, we count the operation of the robotics on a large number of tubes in parallel as a single step and ignore the perhaps serial process of moving d a t a and operator tubes. 2. Total rack tubes. We de ne the number of rack tubes to be the total numb e r o f d a t a t u bes, sticker tubes, and separation operator tubes used during t h e computation. All of the tubes are reusable, so we only need copies of a tube if a particular kind o f t u be must be used more than once in a parallel operation. We note t h a t w e n ever need duplicates of sticker tubes|our robotics are incapable of using more than one sticker tube at once. We will however need duplicate separation operator tubes and many data tubes since we often wish to separate complexes in several di erent data t u bes on the same bit B i at once. 3. Maximum n u m ber of active tubes per operation. We d e ne the n u m ber of active tubes, for any time during the computation, as the number of tubes which t h e robotics have removed from the rack a n d are currently processing. Note t h a t t h e m aximum n u m ber of active t u bes de nesthe width o f t h e parallelism used by our algorithm and h ence it must match the parallelism built i n t o our robotics.
We note that thesequantities are applicable for only for the computation of the ciphertexts step 2 of the molecular algorithm and the selection of the given ciphertext the rst part of step 3 of the molecular algorithm. These parts o f t h e m o lecular algorithm require only the o perations given above a n d h ence are performed using the stickers machine. The initialization of the memory complexes and n al reading of the k ey, h o w ever, use some o perations that are not included above i:e: dividing the contents of a tube into two tubes, PCR ampli cation, ligation, etc. These special operations are used at most once during the implementation of the molecular algorithm and we assume that they could be performedbythehuman operator of the stickers machine in a reasonably short amount of time a few hours and in a small space a few tubes. Hence they are ignored in the nal discussion of the resources required by a s t i c k ers machine Subsection 3.5.
Initialization of the memory strands
First we m ust create t h e initial tube encoding k eys. Our desire is to h a v e e a c h of the 2 56 memory strands store a di erent k ey. This might be accomplished, for example, in the following w ay:
1. Divide t h e m emory strands into t w o t u bes, A and B. 2. Add an excess of S 1 through S 56 to t u be A and allow t h em to s a t urate the rst 56 blocks on each strand. 3. Use the complement o f B 0 as a probe to separate the m emory complexes in tube A from the excess stickers. 4. Add tube B to t u be A. 5. Heat a n d cool t u be A to randomly reanneal the stickers.
The memory complexes produced by this process appear to be reasonably modeled with a P oisson distribution; it is expectedthat a p proximately 63 of keys will be representedand t h a t, on average, there is one o f e a c h k ey. Hence, if no errors are committed during the computation, we have a reasonable chance of recovering t h e k ey for a ciphertext of interest. Of course, the c h ance of succeeding can be increased by starting with more memory strands. To insure that a p proximately 95 of the k eys are representedand t h a t o n a v erage three copies of a key are present, we could simply use three timesas much DNA. Theseissues are discussed in more detail in the Section 4.
Implementing the fundamental operations
As discussed in Section 2, the DES encryption algorithm is a composition of just two simple functions:
x-ors which are 2-bit input t o 1-bit output m aps, S-boxes which are 6-bit input t o 4-bit output m aps.
The computation of the 2-bit to 1-bit x-or function is illustrated in Figure 1 .
We n o w d escribe the computation of the x-or function B k = B i B j in greater detail, give the overhead required, and generalize this to an n-bit to m-bit function:
A. Parallel separate the sample two times to yield four data tubes, one for each possible value B i B j . This is accomplishedby rst using one separation operator tube speci c for B i and t h en, in parallel, using two separation operator tubes speci c for B j . In Figure 1 the bits being considered are shaded gray. Roweis et al: model a single separation as an operation involving three active tubes at once: a source data tube, a separation operator tube, and o n e o f t w o d estination data t u bes picked up and lled by the robotics in sequence. Hence, during each single separation, three tubes are active at once and three data tubes are used. During the second parallel separation above, then, six data tubes are used and six tubes are active. For an n-bit to m-bit function this generalizes to: Parallel separate the sample n timesto yield 2 n data t u bes, one for each value of the n-bit input. This requires 2 i,1 separation operator tubes for the ith parallel separation a total of 2 n , 1. Hence for the nth parallel separation 3 2 n,1 data t u bes are required and 3 2 n , 1 t u bes are active. B. Parallel set B k to 1 with an S k sticker for all tubes for which this is applicable. For an x-or this is only applicable when B i B j = 0 1 o r 1 0 b u t for a general 2-1 function this may require the addition of a sticker to any subset of the four data tubes in parallel. This requires one sticker tube and four data t u bes, a total of ve active tubes. For an n-bit to m-bit function this generalizes to: Parallel set a possibly di erent subset of the 2 n data tubes m times using a total of m sticker tubes. This requires 2 n + 1 active tubes. Note t h a t t h e s u bset of data t u bes to which t h e p arallel set is applied is determinedsolely by the algorithm stored in the microprocessor. C. Parallel combine the contents of all four data t u bes into o n e d a t a t u be.
This requires ve data t u bes and hence ve active tubes.
For an n-bit to m-bit function this generalizes to: Parallel combine the contents of all 2 n data tubes into one data tube. This requires 2 n + 1 d a t a t u bes and 2 n + 1 active tubes.
At t h e e n d of our x-or operation, all of our DNA has been returnedto a s i n gle tube.
In general, an n-bit to m-bit function requires n+m+1steps, 2 n ,1 separation operator tubes speci c to various bits, m sticker tubes, a maximum o f 3 2 n , 1 d a t a t u bes, and a m aximum o f 3 2 n , 1 active tubes.
At this point we can see that one of the resource quantities of interest, the maximum number of active tubes has already been speci ed. An 6-bit to 4-bit S-box is the biggest n-bit to m-bit function we implement in DES so we never use more than 96 active tubes. The only other operation used in the algorithm, clear, u s e s but o n e active tube.
The n u m ber of rack tubes is the s u m o f t h e d a t a, sticker and separation tubes used but w e m ay not simply sum u p t h esenumbers for an S-box a n d regard the result a s i t s contribution to t h e computation. Data t u bes are interchangeable so we know that the maximum number used in an S-box|96|will be the d a t a t u be contribution to t h e t otal rack tube count. However, sticker tubes and separator tubes have an identity, they are associated with a particular block of the memory complexes. For the calculation of rack tubes and total steps as well we need to consider more details of the molecular algorithm.
Thus, in the next subsection we consider how the x-ors and S-boxes used to compute DES are composed, count the total number of steps, and discuss ways to plan our use of separation operator tubes and sticker tubes to minimize the total number of rack tubes.
Computing the ciphertexts
We recall that t h e basic unit of computation in our molecular algorithm is a 4 bit chunk that is computed using a composition of x-ors and S-boxes which takes 16 bits of input. For any given chunk the positions of these16 input bits are the same for every memory complex. Thus the positions of the input bits are hard-coded into t h e microprocessor and we ignore theirexact values in what f o llows.
From our consideration of n-bit to m-bit functions, we know t h a t 4 s t eps are required to compute an x-or and 1 1 s t eps are required to compute an S-box.
From this it follows that t o compute a c h u nk requires 6 4 + 1 1 + 4 4 = 5 1 steps. After a chunk is computed,ifthe w orkspace is to be used again, it must be cleared. To complete the computation requires computing 16 8 = 128
chunks, and clearing the w orkspace 127 times;hence the t otal numb e r o f s t eps required is 6655.
During t h e computation of an x-or, one separation operator tube is required to separate on the rst bit, and t w o separation operator tubes are required to separate in parallel on the second bit. To economize on separation operator tubes when performing x-ors we choose toseparate rst on a bit for which there are many instances of that kind" of bit on the memory complex, and second on a bit for which there are only a few instances of that kind" of bit. Hence, for each x-or involving a bit of R i,2 of which there are 448 possibilities from R 1 ; : : : ; R 14 and a bit from the workspace B 575 ; : : : ; B 578 of which t h ere are only 4, we separate on the R i,2 bit rst and t h e w orkspace bit second. Likewise, for each x-or involving a bit of R i,1 of which t h ere are 480 possibilities from R 1 ; : : : ; R 15 a n d K i of which t h ere are 56 possibilities, we separate on the R i,1 bit rst and the key bit second. It follows that for each o f t h e bits from R 1 ; : : : ; R 15 one separation operator tube speci c to t h a t bit is neededand, for each o f t h e bits o f K and e a c h o f t h e bits B 575 ; : : : ; B 578 two separation operator tubes speci c to that bit are needed. Hence these bits require a t otal of 480 + 2 5 6 + 2 4 = 600 separation operator tubes.
The implementation of the S-boxes demonstrates another way that we may economize on separation operator tubes: frequently used subcomputations do not require that we use up a new bit and consequently another separation operator tube every time t h ey are run. Instead their input a n d o u t put m ay be stored on a rewritable region of the m emory complex|hence our placement o f t h e input t o t h e S-boxes in the rst six workspace positions and t h e o u t put i n t h e last four workspace positions. Because of this, even though there are eight di erent S-boxes one for each chunk they all may use the same separation operator tubes and s t i c k er tubes though, under control o f t h e m i croprocessor, the stickers are applied di erently for each S-box. The S-boxes, then, only require an additional 63 separation operator tubes to separate the DNA into all possible 6-bit strings B 569 ; : : : ; B 574 . Thus, to complete t h e ciphertext generation stage of the algorithm, we require 663 separation operator tubes. In all, 512+10 = 522 sticker tubes are required to h o ld the s t i c k ers used to w r i t e t h e i n t ermediate results a n d w orkspace bits. Recall that our robotics only use one sticker tube at a time. The greatest number of data tubes used during the computation is 96, during the nal parallel separation step of an S-box computation. In total 663 + 512 + 96 = 1271 rack tubes are required to compute t h e ciphertexts.
Selecting the given ciphertext and reading the correct key
Once the ciphertexts h a v e been computed,the d esired key can be selected by searching for the complex which h as the given ciphertext encodednext to i t s k ey. This requires 64 separation steps. Upon isolating t h e d esired complex, it is necessary to read its k ey. Reading could be attempted using s i n gle molecule detection and a binary tree decoding a s d escribed in Ro . However, it is not clear that s u c h a n a p proach can be satisfactorily carried out i n l a b. Below w e d escribe two additional approaches,each of which entails some modi cation of the methodsdescribed in the previous sections:
In the rst approach, the m emory strands are 5 0 biotinylated. Once the ciphertexts have been compute d , a s d escribed in the previous sections, the memory complexes are transformeden masse into single-stranded form. One way to accomplish this is as follows:
1. For each sticker S 0 ; : : : ; S 120 create a new 0-sticker, S 0 i , which shares the 3 0 and 5 0 8-mers with S i but which di ers from it in the middle 4-mer. 2. Add an excess of the S 0 i to t h e n al solution under conditions which favor annealing d espite the mismatches. 3. Add ligase. Each m emory complex now h a s a h eteroduplex region in its k ey-ciphertext section where the non-memory strand consists of a sequence of regular stickers and 0-stickers. Note that our original decision to place the ciphertext next to the key on the memory strands is no longer a mystery. Our placement minimizes the n u m ber of ligations which m ust be successful for a strand which encodesboththeciphertext and key to form. 4. Separate out t h e biotinylatedmemory strands using a streptavidincoatedsolid support and retain the new strands as the library of solutions.
This process essentially converts S t i c k er memory complexes into Lipton style memory strands Li for which each block has one of two unique sequences, one for 0 and another for 1. A ciphertext of interest may be selected by applying t h e usual 64 separation steps, PCR ampli ed using S 0 0 and the complement of the last ciphertext bit as primers, and read with s t andard DNA sequencing. Notice that, once created,thelibrary of solutions can be replicatedby PCR and h ence multiple copies can be made. Each such copy is essentially a codebookconsisting of key, ciphertext pairs. This codebook has approximately 2 56 56 key bits + 64 ciphertext bits = 2 63 bits of information the equivalent of approximately one billion 1 gigabyte CDs but occupies a dry volume of approximately 1 7 of a teaspoon. As Boneh a n d Lipton have noted Bo1 s u c h a codebook could be widely distributedandused to s p e e d up subsequent attacks on DES.
In the second a p proach t o r e ading, instead of converting t o Lipton style memory strands after the computation of ciphertexts, a Lipton-Sticker hybrid model for encoding t h e initial memory complexes is used.
1. Make single-stranded DNAs representing all 2 56 keys using the encoding of Lipton. Additionally, guarantee that each key strand begins and ends with t h e same s h ort PCR primer. 2. Ligate, to e a c h o f t h e Lipton key strands, identical 522 bit Sticker memory strands. 3. Proceed to compute DES as usual. 4. Perform 64 separations on the result t o obtain the complex carrying t h e d esired ciphertext. 5. Perform PCR using t h e p r i m ers which b o u n d t h e Lipton style key sequence. The key sequence will be ampli ed exponentially and may be sequenced.
We note t h a t all of the t echniques for selecting a d esired ciphertext discussed here and in Ro would require 64 separation operations so we approximate that this process requires an additional 64 steps. Further, we note that to e ect all 64 separations an additional 32 separation operator tubes speci c to the bits of R 16 in addition to the 32 separation operator tubes already countedfor R 15 are required.
Discussion
In summary, t o n d t h e k ey for a DES-encodedplaintext-ciphertext pair, we rst create memory complexes representing all keys, then we compute the ciphertext corresponding to each key 6655 steps, and nally we select and read the key of interest 64 steps. This requires a total of 6719 steps, each of which is one of the operations described above.
The actual running t ime for the algorithm depends on how fast the o perations can be performed. If we assume, as we might if a graduate student had to perform each operation, that each operation requires 1 day, then the computation will require 18 years. If each operation requires 1 hour Boneh et al: assume 2.4 hours, Bo2 then the computation will require approximately 9 months. If each operation can be completedin 1 minute, perhaps using a robotic s t i c k ers machine, then the computation will take 5 d ays. Finally, i f t h e e ective duration of a step can be reduced to 1 second, perhaps by running the algorithm in a continuous ow parallel re nery Ro , then the e ort will require 2 h ours. The size of the rack is dictatedbytheamount of DNA used. When the 2 56 memory complexes have h alf of theirsticker positions occupied, as we expect will be the case at t h e e n d o f t h e computation, they weigh approximately .7 g and, in solution at 5 g liter, would occupy a p proximately 140 ml. Hence, the volume o f t h e 1303 rack tubes 1271 for ciphertext computation, an additional 32 for ciphertext selection need be no more than 140 ml each. It follows that the rack tubes occupy, at most, 182 L a n d can, for example, be arrayedin a rack 1 m approximately 39 inches long a n d wide a n d 1 8 c m a p proximately 7 inches deep. Since the robotics must be able to operate on 96 active tubes in parallel we a p proximate t h e v o lume required by t h e robotics, give o r t ake some arms and pumps, as 13 L|1 14th the volume of the rack. The microprocessor is likely to be quite small. Thus, it is reasonable to assume the entire machine w ould t on a desktop. It is worth pointing out that, for much of the computation, the robotics are not processing at full capacity 96 tubes and many of the tubes are sitting idle. Hence it may be possible to increase the parallelism signi cantly by pipelining t h e computation.
Analysis of Errors
We say that an error has occurred whenever a memory complex is transformed in an unintended way or ends up in an unintended place. Hence, there are many kinds of errors that can occur during the operation of our DNA computer: strands can break, stickers can fall o one m emory complex and reanneal to another, complexes can be lost" on the walls of a tube, complexes can end up in the wrong t u be following a separation, e t c. For each operation, we de ne its error rate to be the fraction of molecules that commit an error during t h a t o peration. Some o perations are more prone to errors than others. To simplify our analysis, we de ne E to be the error rate of the worst operation and assume that all of the operations have error rate E. Note that 1 , E corresponds to what chemists call yield. Hence an error rate o f 1 0 , 4 corresponds to a s t ep yield of 99.99.
Given an input ciphertext-plaintext pair, it is possible that several di erent keys map the ciphertext into t h e p laintext though for DES, it seems unlikely that the number of such keys would be large. All such keys will be called winning keys. Under ideal conditions, after the codebookis createdand the separation on the input ciphertext performed, we are left with a nal tube with t h e following properties:
1. For each winning k ey there is at least one complex encoding it. 2. All complexes that are there encode winning k eys.
In reality this can fail for either of two reasons. First, complexes encoding winning keys may be missing, either because they were not created during initialization or because they encountered an error during the computation. Second, there may be distractors: complexes which do not encode winning keys, but d ue to errors end u p i n t h e n al tube anyway. In subsection 4.1 we analyze the probability that a winning key has a complex encoding it in the nal tube. In subsection 4.2 we calculate t h e expectednumber of distractors in the nal tube.
We make t h e following a s s u mptions:
1. After the initialization step, each complex encodesa 56-bit key chosen at random i:e: chosen from the space of all 56-bit keys with equal probability. 2. DES with the input plaintext maps each of the keys to a random ciphertext. 3. A complex which encounters an error during t h e computation produces a random ciphertext i:e: unrelatedtotheciphertext normally associated with t h a t complex's key.
4.1 Probability that a winning key has a complex encoding it in the nal tube
In the computation above, we began with 2 56 memory strands. It will be convenient to carry out the analysis in greater generality. We now assume that we begin with 2 56 X memory strands, where X is a positive rational. Informally, X is the factor by which we multiply our original amount of DNA.
Let K w be a winning key. Following initialization, the number of memory complexes which encode K w is given by a binomially distributed random variable n; p = 2 56 X; 1 2 56 . The probability that a memory complex makesit correctly through all 6655 steps of the computation and 64 steps of the selection process in total 6719 steps is given by:
Hence, after the computation, the number of memory complexes in the nal tube which encode K w is given by a binomially distributedrandom variable n; p = 2 56 X;S 1 2 56 . Because 2 56 X is very large and S 1 2 56 is very small, this distribution may be approximated by a Poisson distribution with Poisson parameter = np = S X.F rom this it follows that the expectednumber of complexes encoding K w in the n al tube is S Xand t h a t t h e probability t h a t a complex encoding K w is in the nal tube is:
In particular when X = 1=S, the expected number of complexes encoding K w in the nal tube is one and the probability that a complex encoding K w is in the nal tube is 63. We will refer to 63 as a reasonable chance.
Number of distractors in the nal tube
For a memory complex M, let HM denote the Hamming distance of the ciphertext encodedonM from the input ciphertext. For M to e n t er the n al tube, HM errors must occur during the nal 64 separation steps. By our assumptions, after the computation of the codebook, each memory complex whether it has encountered an error or not encodes aciphertext which is a random 64 bit string. It follows that the Hamming distances associated with memory complexes will be a binomially distributed random variable n; p = 64; 0:5. Hence, the probability t h a t H M = L is:
The probability of complex M with Hamming d i s t ance HM = L m aking i t t hrough the 64 step selection process is given by the probability that it correctly negotiates64,Lseparations for which i t m a t c h esthe input ciphertext timesthe probability t h a t it commits an error at t h e L separations for which it mismatchesthecorrect ciphertext: Perhaps surprisingly, t h e expectednumber of distractor molecules is independent o f t h e error rate. Note, in particular, that for X=1 the expectednumber of distractors is less than one.
Feasibility
Combining t h e results from 3.2 and 3.3 givesthe f o llowing t a b le which s h o ws for various error rates,the amount of DNA that m ust be pushedthrough the DES computation to insure that t h ere is a reasonable chance 63 of getting a winning key in the nal tube. The table also records the expectednumber of distractors which will be present in the nal tube. This indicatesthat for an error rate o f 1 0 , 4 , a little more that 1 gram of DNA is neededand the nal tube will usually have no distractors. If an error rate of 10 ,3 is achievable, then less than a kilogram of DNA is neededand only a small number of distractors need be dealt with before nding the correct answer. However, if an error rate of 10 ,2 is the best that is attainable, then huge amounts of DNA are neededapproximately 23 Earth masses to have a reasonable chance that a winning k ey ends in the nal tube, but even then it will have t o b e d i s t inguished from a colossal number of distractors -clearly an unacceptable situation. In such cases, where only very high error rates are possible, techniques like those described in Ro for example, a re nery algorithm may be used to reduce the amount of DNA required. In section 5.8 of Ro Roweisetal: give a brief analysis of the application of a re nery algorithm to DES.
Conclusions
We wish to emphasize that our description of an attack on DES is, at this point, entirely theoretical and w h ether it can be carried out i n t h e l a b remains to be seen. Huge challenges remain. For example, as yet, we h a v e been unable to perform separations or any o f t h e s t i c k er operations in the l a b with error rates approaching 10 ,4 . Nonetheless, the analysis presented in this paper demonstratesat least in principle two things:
Real problems" can be solved with small machineswhich do not require huge amounts of DNA and use little or no enzymes. Error rates similar to t h ose normally demanded of electronic computers are not required.
If the a t t ack on DES described here can be carried out i n t h e l a b, then some other cryptosystems might also be vulnerable to this approach. Indeed, the small size of the m achine w e d escribe suggests t h a t systems like t h e 64-bit key FEAL cryptographic system of Shimizu-Miyaguchi Sh might be susceptible to s u c h an attack.
Finally, t h ere are several messages for cryptography in these ndings. First, it seems appropriate t o reconsider one of the axioms" of cryptography: Improvements in computational power always favor the cryptographer over the cryptanalyst. This is almost certainly untrue. The analysis presented here suggests t h e possibility of computers with super-parallelism that can help the cryptanalyst immensely, yet provide no help for the cryptographer. Even if DNA computers prove infeasible, it is possible that new machinesmachines capable of super-parallelism may make cryptosystems like DES insecure.
The DNA computer is an example of a super-parallel machine with v ery slow processors complexes of DNA. The potential vulnerability of DES arises for two reasons. First, the key space is insu ciently large. Second, the DES algorithm is too short." The fact that only 6655 steps are needed to do an encryption allows the slow DNA processors to nish theirencryptions in at least in theory a reasonable amount of time. Hence the much valued throughput s p e e d of DES and similar systems, may carry with i t a p o t ential vulnerability t o super-parallel machines with slow processors. 
